The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, in Brendan Boman v. Catholic Diocese of Grand Rapid et al., Docket No. 338458 (June 2018), which granted summary disposition to the defendants, Catholic Diocese of Grand Rapids, Tom Maj, Greg Deja, and Kyle Shelton. This civil lawsuit stems from the conviction of Abigale Simon, a high school tutor, for three counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of accosting a child for immoral purposes. The plaintiff, who was 15 at the time of the assault, filed suit against defendants on November 20, 2015 alleging claims of direct negligence and vicarious liability for the abuse Simon perpetuated against him. Plaintiff also alleged that the defendants violated Michigan’s Child Protection Law by failing to report the abuse.
https://law.justia.com/cases/michigan/court-of-appeals-unpublished/2018/338458.html
The first argument the plaintiff asserted was vicarious liability because Diocese employees had constructive knowledge of Simon’s propensity to commit abuse and actual knowledge of the abuse. The Court of Appeals ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that the Diocese employees had actual, or constructive knowledge of the sexual abuse. Essentially, an employer’s liability for the criminal acts of its employees is limited to those acts it can reasonably foresee or reasonably should have foreseen, which it found not to be the case with the facts established.
The second argument the plaintiff asserted was that the defendants could be held liable for their own negligent acts because the Diocese assumed the duty to properly train its employees regarding sexual abuse as well as owed plaintiff a duty in loco parentis. The Court ruled that loco parentis covers special relationships such as a teacher to their students, but not relationships such as school administrators, coaches, or institutions like the Diocese. The Court also ruled that even if loco parentis did apply, the plaintiff failed to prove that there was a genuine issue of material fact that Simon’s actions were reasonably foreseeable (a requirement for loco parentis liability).
The third and final argument the plaintiff asserted was that the defendants knew about or suspected Simon’s abuse of the plaintiff, and never complied with the obligation to report the abuse pursuant to MCL 722.623. Again, plaintiff’s argument failed because he could not assert that there was a genuine issue of material fact that the defendants actually knew about the sexual abuse, or that the defendants suspected the abuse because Simon’s actions were not reasonably foreseeable.
Ultimately, Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s findings that (1) the Diocese could not be held liable for Simon’s abuse because it had no actual or constructive knowledge of the abuse, and Simon’s acts were not reasonably foreseeable; (2) plaintiff’s direct negligence claims failed because the defendant’s did not owe plaintiff a duty to prevent Simon’s unforeseeable acts and plaintiff provided no legal support for his assertation that the duty in locos parentis to protect students extended to entities like the Diocese, school administrators like Maj and Deja, or non-teacher staff like Shelton; and (3) plaintiff’s claim for defendants failure to report the abuse under the Child Protection Law failed because neither Maj nor Shelton were mandatory reporters under the statute, plaintiff did not establish that Deja should have reasonably expected the abuse, and the law only creates a private right of action for the identified abused child.
This article was written by Ryan Hansen, Law Clerk
